國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所 九十九學年度 第一學期 研究所課程

心靈哲學問題:人格等同
Personal Identity



授課教師Thomas Benda (卞拓蒙) 教授

學分數3 學分

上課時間:星期三 14:30-17:30

上課教室:心哲所會議室

教學目標

Besides the famous mind-body problem, personal identity is one major topic of discussion within Philosophy of Mind. The issue does not focus on a single problem, but addresses a range of loosely related questions, which nevertheless have been of continued interest in philosophy: What makes us to exist as persons? What makes us to persist as persons with continued identity? Does everyone of us have an identity after all? Who am I?

Our course will rummage through these and related problems by turning to articles in our textbooks, while considering philosophical contexts. Although not much technical background is required, critical thinking will be our indispensable tool of investigation. Those who attended the course “Quantum Consciousness” in Spring 2010 will profit from the discussion of diachronic identity of minds we had there.

The course is meant to be a seminar rather than a lecture, relying on an open discussion of the main issues. Your active participation will be appreciated and your willingness to come prepared is a prerequisite of taking part. As a result, you should be familiar with problems in the context of personal identity, know some relevant philosophical background and be able to assess critically points of view in the field with which you are confronted.

授課進度

Date

Feature

Week 1

Introduction and Overview. Stanford Encyclopedy article by Olson.

Week 2

The problemof personal identity. Perry, Ch. 1.

Week 3

Locke's memory theory and replies. Perry, Ch. 2, 5 - 7.

Week 4

Modern versions of the memory theory. Perry, Ch. 3, 4.

Week 5

Problems with the memory theory. Perry, Ch. 8.

Week 6

Problems with the memory theory. Perry, Ch. 9.

Week 7

Abandonment of personal identity by Hume. Perry, Ch. 10 - 12.

Week 8

Personal identity and survival (Williams). Perry, Ch. 13.

Week 9

Personal identity and survival (Parfit). Perry, Ch. 14.

Week 10

The unity of consciousness (Nagel). Perry, Ch. 15.

Week 11

A dualist theory. Swinburne in Swinburne and Shoemaker.

Week 12

A metarialist's account. Shoemaker in Swinburne and Shoemaker.

Week 13

Authors' replies in Swinburne and Shoemaker.

Week 14

Functionalism and personal identity. Article by Olson (2002).

Week 15

Functionalism and personal identity. Article by Shoemaker (2004).

Week 16

Functionalism and practical concerns. Article by Shoemaker (2007).

Week 17

Functionalism and ethics. Article by Shoemaker (Stanford Encyclopedy).

Week 18

Closing discussion.


指定閱讀及參考書目

Shoemaker, S & Swinburne, R. (1984). Personal Identity. Blackwell.
Perry, J. (Ed.). (2003). Personal Identity. University of California Press.
Contemporary Journal Articles, in particular:
Olson, E. T. (2002). What does functionalism tell us about personal identity? Nous 36, pp. 682–98.
Shoemaker, S. (2004). Functionalism and personal identity--a reply. Nous 38, pp. 525-33.
Shoemaker, S. (2007). Personal identity and practical concerns. Mind 116, pp. 317-357.
Shoemaker, S. Personal identity and ethics. Stanford Encyclopedy. available online.
A useful introduction is the article on Personal Identity by E. T. Olson in the Stanford Encyclopedy

成績考核

Grades are given for at least one oral presentation and a term paper. The term paper shall be written in English and typed (not hand-written) in 12 pt font, 1.5-line-spaced with a total of 7 - 10 pages. In your graded paper, do not copy any passages from books or the internet without properly citing the reference where it was taken from. Copying without citing references constitutes plagiarism, which automatically will lead to failure in this course. Due date and time is Monday 1 pm of the week of the final exam at the latest.
Every student is expected actively to attend class. Active participation will positively affect grades.

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